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Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Reexamined
Abstract
David Hume, known as a strict empiricist, posits that all perceptions are divided into impressions and ideas.
Except for a lower degree of vivacity, ideas directly resemble their corresponding impressions. This is the core of
Hume’s ‘copy principle,’ which claims that all ideas are simply copies of their corresponding more lively
impressions. Following his statement of this principle, however, Hume gives a counterexample to it in the form of a
thought experiment, the Missing Shade of Blue. Many critics have taken this counterexample as proof that Hume is
weakening his empirical claims and, even, that he is contradicting himself. I, however, argue that these criticisms
arise out of a misunderstanding of Hume’s philosophical works. Furthermore, I show how the inclusion of the
thought experiment actually reconciles with and strengthens Hume’s copy principle by way of triangulation. In a
more general scope, I believe the usefulness of my research sheds some light on a topic that, if even considered at
all, has been somewhat muddled in a gray area.

I. Introduction
One of the major divisions among Western philosophers of the 18th century was between
rationalists and empiricists. The debate between rationalism and empiricism centers on whether
our knowledge can have non-sensible and non-empirical sources or whether it is solely
dependent on sensory experience. On the one hand, the rationalist claims that there is knowledge
that can be gained independently of sensory experience. On the other hand, the empiricist claims
that experience is the sole and foundational source of all our knowledge. Rationalists also claim
that certain types of knowledge are innate. Descartes, for example, argues that our concept of
God as an infinitely perfect being is innate. This concept of God is not directly obtained through
sensory experience, in the manner that our concepts of cats and trees are obtained, namely
through tastes, smells, sights, and sounds. Instead, we are born with it. Conversely, empiricists
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generally accept John Locke’s tabula rasa 1 argument for the way the mind works. According to
Locke, it is sensory experience that feeds knowledge into our minds. For empiricists, the innate
ideas proposed by rationalists are either fictitious or must be considered derivative of our
experience.
David Hume, born in Edinburgh in 1711, is one of the most influential empiricists of the
18th century. Well known as being a historian and essayist, Hume’s philosophical works
influenced future thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Charles Darwin. 2 As an empiricist, David
Hume also makes this rejection of innate ideas and acceptance of sensory foundationalism the
core of his philosophy. Known as a strict empiricist, Hume takes the empirical ideas of John
Locke and George Berkeley to an extreme. For example, unlike Locke and Berkeley, both of
whom stray from a strictly empiricist approach when proving God’s existence 3, Hume maintains
that any evidence must come from our senses. This is evident in Hume’s copy principle, which
states that all of our ideas are weaker yet exact copies derived from what he terms impressions.
Furthermore, these impressions themselves, according to Hume, derive immediately from
sensory experience.
Perhaps Hume’s most notable works in philosophy are A Treatise of Human Nature and
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume published the Treatise upon returning to
England in 1737 after attending a Jesuit college in France. It received very little literary notice
and was ‘dead-born from the press,’ as Hume put it in an autobiographical publication written in
1

Latin for “blank slate” and refers to Locke’s theory that at birth no knowledge we have is innate. The mind
is, therefore a “blank slate” waiting to be filled with data obtained through sensory experience.
2
William Edward Morris, “David Hume”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3
th
Both John Locke and George Berkeley were prominent empiricists of the 18 century. Locke claims that
our knowledge of God comes from our intuition and Berkeley claims that God is himself an infinite spirit. Patricia
Sheridan, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 2.3. Lisa Downing, “George
Berkeley”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 3.1.3.
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1776. 4 His strict empiricism, seen in opposition to religious teachings, garnered him the
reputation of an atheist. As a result, contemporary authors and thinkers of the time consistently
scrutinized and denounced Hume’s philosophical works throughout his life. Disappointed in the
failure of the Treatise, Hume released what he thought was a more concise and focused
presentation of his principles in the Enquiry roughly fifteen years later. In a public advertisement
he boldly stated that “he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the
whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligence in his former reasoning and more in
the expression, are, he hopes, corrected.” 5 Hence, the Enquiry, which received a greater
readership when compared to the Treatise, was, to Hume, very much a fine tuning of his
Treatise. Yet, even after fifteen years of contemplation and revision, the Enquiry retains some
items virtually unchanged, among them the one that is of importance to this study: Hume’s
example of the Missing Shade of Blue. 6
The Missing Shade of Blue is a thought experiment that Hume conjures early on in both
the Treatise and Enquiry. Essentially, this thought experiment proposes that not all ideas derive
from impressions. This, in turn, ostensibly presents a problem for Hume by conflicting directly
with his copy principle, which states the opposite. Thus, it is surprising to find the Missing Shade
of Blue brought into Hume’s texts, especially so soon after he established the copy principle. The
inclusion of both the copy principle and the Missing Shade of Blue in the Treatise and Enquiry
shows that Hume was intent on bringing forth both points. However, by doing so he raises

4

David Hume, “My Own Life”.
David Hume, “Author’s Advertisement”, An Enquiry Concerning The Principal of Morals.
6
Going forward, ‘Missing Shade of Blue’ refers to Hume’s thought experiment, while ‘missing shade of
blue’ refers to the deficiency in the final shade of blue not presented in the experimental set-up of the thought
experiment.
5
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several doubts about his core philosophy. The following is Hume’s main formulation of the
Missing Shade of Blue:
Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly
acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has
been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of the colour, except that single one, be placed
before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank,
where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the
contiguous colour than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him, from his own imagination, to
supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can. And this may
serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent
impressions, though this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our observing and does not merit
that for it alone we should alter our general maxim (T 1.1.1.10). 7

On the surface this sounds as if Hume is contradicting his own philosophical principles.
He is, after all, committed to the empiricist claim that sensory experience is the sole source of
our ideas. Specifically, Hume seems contradictory by presenting an example that directly refutes
his copy principle, which stipulates that “each simple idea is a ‘copy’ of the simple impression
that it is derived from.” 8 However, a detailed analysis of both the missing shade of blue as well
as of other areas in both the Treatise and Enquiry will in fact demonstrate that his inclusion of
the missing shade was not only justifiable, but that it serves to strengthen his principles. In
particular, the inclusion of the thought experiment, strengthens his copy principle rather than
diminish it. Furthermore, my analysis shows how Hume critically assesses his own theories
allowing for the adaptability of the Missing Shade of Blue to be a part of them. Finally, my paper
7
8

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (T. 1.1.1.10). Further abbreviated as Treatise.
Reginald Savage, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue,” 200.
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shows how Hume’s critical assessment contextually, linguistically, and rhetorically ties the
Missing Shade of Blue into the Treatise and Enquiry.
II. Breaking Down The Missing Shade of Blue
In the excerpt above, Hume states that the Missing Shade of Blue ‘serves as proof’ and
‘is an instance’ in which his copy principle is violated. This instance, to Hume, is so singular it
does not warrant a change in his principle, yet it still warrants the simple idea of the missing
shade as an exception. To understand why Hume considered the Missing Shade of Blue as
presenting an exception to his principle that every idea derives from a corresponding impression,
it is first necessary to define these two terms, idea and impression, as well as to break down the
example itself.
According to Hume, all of our experience divides into two categories, which he labels
impressions and ideas. For Hume, impressions are simply livelier experiences than ideas. In
other words, ideas represent faint images of their corresponding impressions. An understanding
of this distinction serves to provide a clearer picture of Hume’s philosophy.
Specifically, Hume states that the “first circumstance, that strikes [his] eye, is the great
resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of
force and vivacity.” 9 This means that impressions and ideas are virtually identical aside from
force and vivacity, namely that impressions are more vivid than ideas since they are sensations.
The key here is that force and vivacity are referring to a difference in degree rather than a
difference in kind. 10 For example, when comparing the sensory experience of an apple with the

9

Treatise, (T 1.1.1.3).
In other words, a difference in kind focuses on the distinction and difference between two objects or
ideas, while a difference in degree focuses on their similarities and resemblances.

10
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memory of an apple, Hume says that experiencing the apple is livelier even though every aspect
of the memory may be the same as the actual experience. Thus, because of this almost identical
resemblance Hume makes a bold general principle when stating that our ideas are simply fainter
versions, or copies, of our more lively impressions. Furthermore, he does not feel it is too
difficult a concept to grasp when he writes the following in the first paragraph of the Treatise: “I
believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every
one of himself will readily perceive the difference between betwixt thinking and feeling (T
1.1.1.1).” 11 Turning back to our example of the apple, feeling equates to the impression of an
apple, whereas thinking relates to the idea of an apple. Therefore, the difference between feeling
and thinking, according to Hume, is comparable to the difference between impressions and ideas;
the difference being that of degree rather than kind. Hume, however, does not stop at this one
distinction between ideas and impressions.
His second categorization of our experience comes from the distinction that he
establishes between what he calls ‘simple’ and complex’. According to Hume, both impressions
and ideas can either be simple or complex. That is, there are now four categories of impressions
and ideas: simple impressions, simple ideas, complex impressions, and complex ideas. The main
distinction between simple and complex, Hume argues, is that simple impressions and ideas
cannot be broken down further. In other words, simple impressions and ideas are the building
blocks of their complex counter parts. Here Hume brings in the following example about an
apple to illustrate this point: “Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united
in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from

11

Ibid, (T 1.1.1.1).
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each other (T 1.1.1.2). 12” Thus, it is the fact that we can conceive of the properties of the apple,
such as its color and taste, in other objects that make the idea of the apple itself a complex idea.
If, on the other hand, we examine the individual property of color in the apple, red in this
instance, it then becomes possible to consider it as a simple idea for the very reason Hume stated.
The actual shade of red that we perceive through our sight, in contrast, is a simple impression.
Again, this divergence between the memory of the shade of red in an apple with the sensory
experience of the apple is simply that of one in degree. It is these distinctions regarding ideas and
impressions as well as simple and complex that concern Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue
example.
Turning, in light of these distinctions between impressions and ideas, to Hume’s Missing
Shade of Blue, I find it helpful to break apart the thought experiment into five parts in order to
understand what Hume is aiming at. These five parts are chronologically important and are as
follows:
1. An individual must have experienced, through sight, a vast range of colors over an
extended period of time.
2. The individual must have become “perfectly acquainted” with all shades of blue except
for one.
3. All shades of blue, less the one the individual had not experienced, are placed in front of
him in descending order. Doing this does not seem practical in the sense that in order to
place all but one shade of blue in front of the individual, it requires the person placing
the colors to know both of all the shades of blue as well as which shade the individual is

12

Ibid, (T 1.1.1.2).
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lacking in. Thus, although the thought experiment can work out in our minds, it is not
applicable in an empirical setting.
4. The individual will first perceive a blank where the missing shade ought to be. This blank
is essentially the individual noticing the variance between the contiguous colors of the
missing shade of blue. Hence, perceiving a blank, in this instance, is not literal but more
like realizing that another shade should be in between the two already known shades of
blue.
5. Finally, the individual will be reasonable and, from his own imagination, fill in the
missing shade even though he has not experienced it.
Bringing to mind Hume’s initial claim that all ideas are merely fainter copies of their
corresponding impressions, it seems that the now-no-longer-missing shade of blue does not fit
the mold here, for it is an idea that came about without a corresponding impression. The setup of
the thought experiment, namely its unique and singular nature, according to Hume, is the reason
he does not consider the Missing Shade of Blue a threat. Additionally, he did not elaborate on
the thought experiment or explicitly explain it in any greater detail. This move by Hume initially
made the inclusion of the missing shade in both the Treatise and Enquiry even more difficult to
defend. However, looking at the example in the five divided parts makes for a better analysis for
both Hume’s reasoning as well any counterclaims made by contemporary philosophers.
III. The Missing Shade of Blue: Exception, Not a Threat
Looking at the steps of Hume’s thought experiment, the first two are critical in allowing
the individual to progress to the next phase of the Missing Shade of Blue, eventually reaching the
simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Without having had the experience of all the other
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shades of blue it becomes an impossibility to come up with the now no longer missing shade,
save for being able to experience it via sensory means. The role of the first two steps of my
analysis of the thought experiment, thus, is to serve as the foundation that the final shade of blue
depends on. This means that although the missing shade of blue itself is a simple idea that comes
about without a corresponding impression, it still requires prior experiences as a foundation for
its emergence. The prior shades of blue themselves, however, were indeed impressions since
Hume states that the individual became “perfectly acquainted” with them. Since no prior
impression of the final shade of blue exists to allow for a copy, the mind fulfills the copy
principle through reasoning with the prior experiences it does have impressions of. Therefore, as
a result of this dependence on prior experience, Hume did not see the Missing Shade of Blue as a
threat. Hence, the importance, at least in part, of the Missing Shade of Blue “is that it is the first
of several cases Hume gives of ideas which the mind, working on precedent [experience], is able
to form by its own activity.” 13 Given the function of these preceding experiences, or shades of
blue, I label them secondary impressions in this instance. This is contrary to their primary
function of being distinct impressions for their own simple ideas of shades of blue via the copy
principle. The label itself is strictly for prior simple impressions that have a specific secondary
function of laying a foundation when placed in a spectrum. In the Missing Shade of Blue this
refers to the already acquired shades of blue, which caused their own corresponding simple
ideas. Those simple ideas of other shades of blue, in turn, lead to the missing shade of blue by
way of the remaining three parts of the thought experiment.
This construct of secondary impressions as well as abstract reasoning creates what Hume
calls habits or customs in an individual. According to Hume, an individual creates a causal
13

Ronald Butler, ‘Hume’s Impressions’ in Impressions of Empiricism, Pp. 130-31.

P a g e | 11

inference, which leads to the creation of a habit or custom. Within the thought experiment, we do
this via a combination of our secondary impressions along with our ability to infer, abstractly,
about the notions of cause and effect and their relation to shades of blue. Hence, this ability to
make inferences about causality, for Hume, allows an individual to use prior experiences of
shades of blue to create a generalization. The generalization then sets up a benchmark to measure
against when necessary. For example, if an individual has several experiences of objects falling
when dropped, the individual will eventually come to the generalization that objects will fall
when let go of. Additionally, this generalization, or habit, is now applied to future experiences
even though there may arise a situation when an object does in fact not fall when dropped. In the
Missing Shade of Blue we have a spectrum of shades of blue, or secondary impressions, that
couple with abstract reasoning, or our ability to tell the difference between shades through causal
inference, in order to form a habit. The habit then allows us to move forward in the thought
experiment by allowing the individual to infer about the comparable differences in the two
adjacent shades to the missing shade of blue, namely that they are not in line with the rest of the
spectrum. This realization equates with Hume’s notion of being able to perceive the blank within
the spectrum. Meaning that the individual does not need to perceive an actual blank but rather
realize a disturbance in the continuity of the spectrum before being able to fill in the missing
shade of blue.
D.M. Johnson analyzes Hume’s principle of habits and customs in greater detail. Johnson
claims that “for a person to reconstruct a shade he never saw before, he must have developed an
appropriately detailed ‘habitual spectrum’.” 14 This spectrum is essentially composed of the
different shades of blue that the individual previously experienced, or the third division in our
14

D.M. Johnson, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue, Interpreted as Involving Habitual Spectra,” Pp 115-16.
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analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue. The parts of the spectrum themselves are simple ideas
obtained through sensory means. However, individually these simple ideas are not in direct
connection to each other, meaning that they are separate and distinct simple ideas. Furthermore,
Johnson extends his idea by stating that each simple idea is itself sui generis 15 and that it is the
steadily obtained habit that puts the simple ideas into certain relations. The previously
experienced shades of blue in front of the individual, thus, do not have any necessary direct
relation to each other. Rather, it is the individual that imposes the relation through the use of a
habit. Individually, the shades of blue are merely simple impressions while collectively the
individual gives them the function of secondary impressions. Hence it is these habitually
imposed connections that allow the individual to conceive of the missing shade of blue.
Linking the third part of our analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue, the spectrum
presented to the individual, to the fourth part, the perception of a blank by the individual, further
showcases how the final shade of blue comes about through secondary impressions. Hume’s first
claim within the thought experiment is that the individual first perceives a gap where the shade
should be. However, this alone requires having knowledge of certain abstract 16, or complex,
ideas. The function of these abstract ideas allows the individual to form the necessary habits that
the final part of the thought experiment requires. Essentially, the man of thirty years who has
experienced all but one shade of blue “will have made many of those several comparisons of
which colors are susceptible and formed the abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation –

15

Sui generis is a term that refers to the unique, deterministic, and/or qualitative nature of something.
Generally used in contrast to something that is quantifiable or universal.
16
Abstract, in this sense, contrasts with concrete ideas. Specifically, abstract is referring to objects that are
not spatial. Hence, objects like mathematics are considered abstract while objects such as trees and rocks are
considered concrete.
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determinate forms of the abstract idea of degree of quality that take as more determinate forms
the abstract ideas of the distinct hues and their distinct shades.” 17
These abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation are necessary conditions in order
to move from the ‘perceiving a blank’ step of the Missing Shade of Blue to the ‘filling in the
blank’ step. However, these abstract ideas are obtained in the same fashion that Hume has set up
in his initial principle; namely that all ideas precede their impressions save for the type of idea of
the missing shade of blue. Hume takes note of this in the Treatise when he writes: “Ideas
produce images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or
immediately, from their corresponding impressions (T. 1.1.1.11).” 18 Hume, therefore, clearly
saw that his initial principle still holds true, even of the Missing Shade of Blue. Accordingly, he
did not find it to be a threat since it is foundationally dependent on the individual’s command of
secondary impressions through the use of the abstract ideas of hue, brightness, and saturation that
led to the final shade of blue.
Looking now to the transition between part four, perceiving the blank, to part five, filling
in the blank with the missing shade of blue, it becomes evident that the individual has a firm
grasp of what hue, brightness, and saturation are with respect to the spectrum of blue shades
presented in front of him. Furthermore, although the distinction between lightness and darkness
as well as hue initially applies to a spectrum of shades of color, the individual should then be
able to distinguish these features in a single shade. 19 Thus, the habit firmly established through
prior experience fills the initial blank with the no longer missing shade of blue. Looking at the
17
18
19

William Williams, “Is Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue a Red Herring,” 91.
Treatise, (T 1.1.1.11).
Karann Durland, “Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of Reason,” 111.
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general exception, the individual experienced various shades of blue, which were each
themselves distinct ideas without any necessary relations to each other. Over the course of time,
and more experiences, however, these distinct ideas began to appear connected through the
individual’s habits created from prior experiences. The individual then uses these benchmarks to
measure the difference in hue, brightness, and saturation among the secondary impressions
against the perceived blank, eventually filling in the gap with the final shade of blue. The habit
does this by way of generalizing, categorizing, and comparing the secondary impressions in
relation to the perceived blank. Therefore, it is a distinction of reason that creates the relation
between the shades within Hume’s spectrum, giving the individual the ability to arrive at the
missing shade of blue.
The distinction of reason that makes this possible yet non-contradictory for Hume is
discussed in the Treatise as well. When discussing abstract ideas, Hume gives us the following
example:
Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed
in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the color from the form. But observing
afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we
find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little
more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that
is, we consider the figure and colour together since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but
still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible. When we
consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea of both the figure and
colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble (T 1.1.7.18). 20

20

Treatise, (T 1.1.7.18).
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What Hume discusses here is the progression of initial sensory experiences in connection with
the ability to reason allowing the individual to be able to dissect and categorize the initial
inseparable experience. This system of progression, like that of the Missing Shade of Blue, is
still dependent on the function of secondary impressions combined with abstract reasoning. In
this case, the habit allows the individual to be able to distinguish between form and color similar
to the filling in of the final shade of blue in the thought experiment. Thus, the missing shade is
simply an exception to the rule in the same manner of one arriving at the idea of a gray colored
block or globe. Although Hume does show a refinement of how ideas form in the above
example, he still considers the Missing Shade of Blue a mere exception. This is on the basis that
the missing shade of blue comes about mediately from impressions as opposed to immediately
from them. Similarly, our capacity to distinguish form from color comes about mediately from
the impressions of the different colors and shapes that we previously experience. Through the
use of the marble globe and block example, therefore, we see not only an extension of the
concept behind the Missing Shade of Blue but a reinforcement of why Hume thought his general
maxim need no alteration.
IV. Hume’s Copy Principle & Causality
According to David Landy, Hume’s copy principle rests on two conditions that allow it to
function. Landy identifies these two conditions as the following:
1. The Resemblance Condition – which stipulates that the ideas an individual forms are
exact representations of the impressions that they have felt.
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2. The Causal Condition – a notion which states that an individual’s ideas are caused
by their impressions and not vice versa. 21
Additionally, Landy states that both conditions are “necessary and jointly sufficient.” 22 This
means that an idea is required to meet both of these conditions in order to qualify as a copy.
Therefore, if the final shade of blue fails to meet either condition, it gives us reason to say that
Hume’s copy principle no longer holds. Since, however, the resemblance condition requires us to
have both the idea and impression of the final shade of blue in the spectrum, it is not testable. In
the Missing Shade of Blue, the individual obtains the simple idea of the final shade of blue, not
its corresponding impression. Furthermore, Hume does not mention that the individual will
receive the impression of the final shade after having the simple idea of the final shade of blue.
Thus, in order to see if the Missing Shade of Blue debunks Hume’s copy principle, we need to
see if it violates the causal condition set forth by Hume.
For the idea of the final shade of blue to violate the causal condition, it needs to cause the
impression of the final shade of blue. In other words, a reversal of the causal order between ideas
and impressions has to occur. Nancy Kendrick introduces this argument with her concept of
temporal order. Specifically, she focuses on ‘reversed temporal order’ 23 when making her claim
that it is often confused with ‘reversed causal order’. Kendrick succinctly states this when
writing that the “idea of the missing shade of blue provides an exception to this temporal priority
claim, but this reversed temporal relation does not provide sufficient grounds for supposing the
causal relation to be reversed.” 24 Thus, when looking at the Missing Shade of Blue, Hume does

21
22
23
24

David Landy, “Hume’s Impression/Idea Distinction,” 125.
Ibid, Pp. 127.
The temporal priority principle states that all causes must precede their respective effects.
Nancy Kendrick, “Why Hume’s Counterexample is Insignificant and Why it is Not,” 970.
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not imply that the simple idea of the found shade of blue causes the impression of it but rather
that in this instance it simply came before it. In fact, Hume does not even mention anything else
about the impression of the found shade other than that its simple idea came before it. This alone,
does not violate the causal condition.
Suppose, however, that we extend Hume’s thought experiment and say that after the
individual found the missing shade of blue, we present the individual with paint along with a
canvas asking him to mix together the final shade of blue. The individual should then be able to
paint the found shade solely from the simple idea of the found shade. However, even if the
individual is able to paint the found shade, it still does not show the reverse in causal order, or
that the idea caused the impression. The question raised now is whether the simple idea or a
sensory experience caused the impression of the final shade of blue. Thus, it is not possible to
use an empirical test to see if the simple idea of the found shade causes the impression. Given
this argument, therefore, there is simply not enough evidence to say that a violation in the causal
condition or, by extension, the copy principle occurs. The copy principle then not only maintains
its initial claims but simultaneously acknowledges and accepts the exception brought about
before it. This, however, does not mean that the thought experiment itself is not altering the way
in which Hume’s principle functions. A deeper analysis of Hume’s own view on the matter sheds
light on this.
V. Hume’s Self-Criticism
Hume’s writing, both in the Treatise and Enquiry as well as beyond, shows that he takes
nothing on faith and self-critically analyzes and questions even his foundational principles. This
is already notable in the fact that he took fifteen years to chisel away at the inessential portions of
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the Treatise as well as concisely restate his philosophy in the Enquiry. Furthermore, he is critical
of and publicly calls his own work, the Treatise, a ‘juvenile work’ in the same advertisement
previously mentioned. Hence, we see that Hume constantly scrutinized himself, and took great
care with his words. Looking closely at the Treatise itself also reveals this level of care,
specifically regarding the Missing Shade of Blue.
The first instance from our analysis compares Hume’s copy principle that all ideas are
copies of and arise from impressions, to the main formulation of the Missing Shade of Blue.
Hume’s initial principle is stated as a universal rule, namely due to the fact that Hume uses the
word all in his formulation of the principle. After mentioning the thought experiment as an
exception, however, Hume subsequently refers to the principle only as a “general maxim.” 25
Unlike universal rules, general maxims allow for exceptions. As such, a valid general maxim
“only needs to be true, as Aristotle stated regarding the maxims of his Ethics, ‘for the most
part.’” 26 Although subtle in nature, Hume does slightly change his reference to the copy principle
after mentioning the Missing Shade of Blue. There is, however, a more direct example that
follows later in the Treatise.
When discussing causal relations between ideas and impressions in the Treatise, Hume
also presents a critique directly related to his previously mentioned Missing Shade of Blue. Here
Hume directly addresses his firmly established copy principle, specifically with regards to any
proof that may come up against it. The following quote targets examples like the Missing Shade
of Blue that may arise:

25
26

Treatise, (T 1.1.1.10).
Reginald Savage, “Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue,” 201.

P a g e | 19
Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any
similar impression? This would be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy; since the contrary principle
has already so firmly established, as to admit of no farther doubt; at least till we have more fully examined
the present difficulty (T 1.3.2.12). 27

In other words, the evidence backing the copy principle so great that, if there is such an idea that
precedes its impression, then it would definitely warrant further examination. Hume, therefore,
does not recommend a simple tossing aside of the general maxim since it has a great deal of
empirical support. Rather, any contrary proofs need additional examination and empirical
backing in order to determine if they are truly contradictory. Hume’s reasoning here takes into
consideration his very own Missing Shade of Blue, which is in fact an exception. It, however, is
not a contradictory one since the idea of the missing shade of blue comes about through
secondary impressions coupled with abstract reasoning. Hume is, however, open and willing to
accept any contrary proof as long as it is based on empirical evidence.
Another self-critique from Hume appears right after the Missing Shade of Blue in the
Treatise. Specifically, Hume makes distinctions between what he terms primary and secondary
ideas. Primary ideas are simply copies, or images, of our impressions, while secondary ideas are
copies of primary ideas. Hence, we have a similar form of triangulation that presented itself
within the Missing Shade of Blue. Hume goes on to say that this “is not, properly speaking, an
exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it.” 28 The reason this case is an explanation of
the principle is because the foundation of both secondary and primary ideas are still impressions.
It just so happens that in this case, there is a third step in between the two. Thus, a similar form
of triangulation occurs as it did between our previously defined secondary impressions and
27
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simple ideas. That is, an impression yields a secondary impression, which, in turn, yields a
simple idea when coupled with abstract reasoning.
In the Missing Shade of Blue, this takes place between the previously experienced shades
of blue, the function of these previous shades as secondary impressions when coupled with
abstract reasoning, and the simple idea of the final shade of blue. The difference between the two
cases, however, is large enough for Hume to admit that the Missing Shade of Blue case is an
exception while stating that the primary and secondary ideas case is not. Therefore, as Nancy
Kendrick concludes, we see that “while [the Missing Shade of Blue] does present a
counterexample to the principle in the ways discussed above, [it] similarly serves as an
explanation of, and even support for, Hume’s most basic empirical aims.” Furthermore, Hume’s
explanation shows that he was well aware of the similar nature of the Missing Shade of Blue,
with that of primary and secondary ideas, and sees it as no threat.
VI. Possible Arguments against Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Defused
There are several contemporary philosophers that present different arguments against
Hume showing how the Missing Shade of Blue weakens his empirical position. The arguments
range from attacking the language within the text itself, specifically that of the Missing Shade of
Blue, to Hume’s credibility directly. Each argument presented, however, stems from a
misunderstanding of either Hume’s thought experiment or his empirical claims. The first
argument against the Missing Shade of Blue deals with Hume’s claim about the example’s
singularity. Specifically, Hume’s claim about the missing shade being a singular instance does
not seem to be the case. Bernard Rollin, for example, writes that Hume’s exception is “far from
singular” and that it is in fact “generalizable to an infinite number of such spectral cases, such as
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regular gradations of musical tones, smells, and so forth.” 29 In other words, Hume’s thought
experiment does not need to focus just on shades of color but anything that is arrangeable in a
spectrum. For example, the thought experiment is equally applicable to a spectrum of sound
arranged in tonal order. In this example, the individual can arrive at the missing tonal sound in
the same manner as Hume’s thought experiment. Therefore, it seems reasonable for Hume to
either adjust his principles to account for this generalized exception or explicitly dismiss the
though experiment. He, however, does neither.
Rollin’s argument concerning the singularity of the missing shade of blue is defused
when looking at the reasoning associated with Hume’s method of categorization. When Hume
states that the “instance is so singular,” he essentially categorizes the example of the missing
shade of blue as a type of idea within a series of other ideas. Karann Durland, for example,
places the exception as a “simple idea of a member of a special sort of series, a series of simple
sensibles (such as shades of the same hue) that differ from one another only by degree.” 30
Therefore, the categorization of the missing shade of blue is that of a type of idea that can fit into
a spectrum of sorts. The spectrum can be of shades of color, differences in tone, or any other
similar idea that can be a part of a series within a spectrum. Hence, the type of idea that the
missing shade of blue falls under is in fact singular in nature. Durland borrows this concept from
Robert Fogelin, who argues that the missing shade of blue is a member of this singular type of
idea because after having experienced all the other shades of blue the subject just needs to
“produce a specific peg to fit a determinate hole provided for it.” 31 This means that any missing
idea within a spectrum presented before an individual falls under the same type of idea as the
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missing shade of blue. Upon examining the so called ‘infinite’ amount of such cases involving
senses like taste, smell and hearing, the common link, namely that each of the missing ideas in
all the cases fits within a spectrum, places all such cases into this singular type of category. Thus,
we can say that all ideas like the missing shade of blue are just different instances of this singular
type. The function of each of those instances as an exception to Hume’s copy principle is,
however, identical to that of the missing shade.
A more common criticism of Hume directly focuses on how his Missing Shade of Blue
contradicts the very principles he previously mentioned as well as further elaborated on in both
the Treatise and Enquiry. Specifically, the attacks are generally in reference to the copy principle
established by Hume in the beginning of the Treatise and Enquiry. What this implies is that if the
missing shade of blue is a valid exception it should debunk the copy principle as a whole. After
all, the copy principle cannot hold if the missing shade, according to Hume, is an instance where
a simple idea does not have a corresponding impression. Furthermore, if the missing shade of
blue was indeed an exception it would warrant an empirical explanation for the dismissal of such
an exception.
In order to know why the argument against Hume’s copy principle is not well grounded,
we first need a deeper understanding of the principle itself. The two main points to keep in mind
are that simple ideas are fainter copies of their corresponding simple impressions and that simple
impressions precede simple ideas. With this in mind, the problem of the missing shade tends to
be with the latter portion of the principle. This causal relation between ideas and impressions is
what generally attempts to invalidate Hume’s entire copy principle. Durland, again, provides an
argument for why Hume’s copy principle need not worry. She argues that since the exception is
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founded on a priori 32 grounds, it is more “illusory” and essentially is more of a “complex [idea]
rather than simple.” 33 However, this reasoning is itself very weak in that Hume himself regarded
the missing shade of blue as an exception to his copy principle.
Donald Livingston, on the other hand, makes a strong case for Hume when claiming that
the exception actually gives Hume the leverage he sought for his copy principle. He states the
following:
Moreover, the idea in question is described as the sort of idea for which an internal mastery could be
achieved in the usual way and, in any case, is in fact achieved by the conditions of the hypothetical
example. So whatever account we give the exception, it is stated in such a way as to be parasitic upon the
very sort of internal understanding the first principle is supposed to capture. Hume, then, can be confident
that for this sort of “exception” whatever modifications are necessary will be minor, need not be explored
at the outset, and so should not affect the basic utility of the principle. 34

Livingston is essentially saying that since the simple idea itself is dependent on the simple ideas
of the other shades of blue, which the individual did obtain through impressions. This ‘internal
mastery’ that Livingston speaks of is simply referring to the function of what we previously
termed secondary impressions coupled with abstract reasoning. In other words, as we already
mentioned, the causal relation between ideas and impressions still holds. Hence, though the
simple idea of the missing shade of blue itself may come before its simple impression, the fact
that the attainment of the missing shade rests on the impressions of the other shades of blue does
not invalidate the copy principle. Rather, the causal relations would now come in the order of
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A priori is generally referred to as knowledge that is completely independent from experience.
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grounds.
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impressions, secondary impressions, and then the simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Our
previous argument about the triangulation that occurs in order to obtain the missing shade of
blue, therefore, diffuses these so called threats to Hume’s copy principle.
When considering an explanation of the Missing Shade of Blue, we run into more
problems simply because of the nature of the very example itself. Looking back at Hume’s
thought experiment, which yields the missing shade of blue, the main issue becomes how he can
argue for the missing shade as an exception. Specifically, empirically verifying the thought
experiment proves to be futile. That is, after the individual has the idea of the missing shade of
blue they should now be able to empirically prove to a third party that they in fact did obtain the
missing shade. Bernard Rollin brings this issue forward and argues that Hume’s missing shade of
blue “cannot be tested on these grounds since the act of actually verifying the test would in
essence nullify the test itself.” 35 According to Rollin, this occurs because we no longer know
whether the individual obtained the simple idea prior to the impression he has just presented the
third party. Suppose, for example, the individual has paint from all the previously experienced
shades of blue and needs to prove that he has obtained the final shade by painting it on a surface.
Even if the individual mixes the appropriate shades and does paint the final shade, it becomes
unclear if the individual obtained the idea of the final shade prior to its impression. In other
words, Hume’s example of the Missing Shade of Blue is one that formulates on a priori grounds
while not being testable through a posteriori means. 36 Hence, any attempts at empirically
verifying the thought experiment would in fact nullify the very purpose of the attempt.
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When considering the problem of validity of the exception as an exception, we can refer
to our previous breakdown of the Missing Shade of Blue. Firstly, it is important to note what
Hume is requesting of his readers when bringing up the counterexample. Specifically, when
stating that the subject will first “perceive a blank” and then fill it, Hume is using deductive
reasoning as his basis for arriving at the missing shade of blue. This means that the example
itself is arrived at using purely logical reasoning as opposed to empirical evidence, which would
have had to be obtained through sensory perception. Thus the missing shade is seen as being
grounded as an a priori example.
Knowing this, it becomes clear that Hume was intent on labeling the Missing Shade of
Blue as an exception, unlike his categorization of primary and secondary ideas. If there was an
idea that came prior to its impression, then it would in fact need to be grounded in a priori and
have no empirical evidence in order to truly be an exception to Hume’s first principle. This very
notion of the type of example that Hume presents in essence is the thing that makes the Missing
Shade of Blue a valid exception. Attempting to prove the creation of the simple idea through an a
posteriori test has the opposite effect in that, if proven true, it would show that the causal link
between impressions and ideas is gray at best. This, however, is not a problem for Hume because
it simply shows that the thought experiment he presents is indeed an exception while
simultaneously not being a threat since testing it on a posteriori grounds proves inconclusive. An
argument for changing the example to a different kind using different sensory perceptions may
be tempting at this juncture.
Any attempt made to find an example that can show the validity of Hume’s exception
using an a posteriori test must simultaneously not nullify the causal condition set by Hume’s
copy principle. Instead of shades of color, suppose different pitches of tones were used.
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Furthermore, the subject would then have experienced each different pitch except for one. In the
same fashion of the Missing Shade of Blue, the subject would be able to fill in the blank for the
tone after first perceiving as a “blank.” However, when comparing the tonal example to Hume’s
Missing Shade of Blue it is clear that they both have the same validity problem. That is, no such
a posteriori test can disprove the causal condition without nullifying the very purpose of the test.
Furthermore, this is true for all such similar cases involving other sensory experiences. Hence,
leaving the type of example as an a priori exception seems to work better for Hume’s sake with
regards to the Missing Shade of Blue being a true exception.
The next argument against Hume focuses on the process of the thought experiment itself.
Doing this, also poses a potential problem for Hume as well. Specifically, the issue deals with
the concept of innate ideas as a result of the process of the thought experiment. William H.
Williams takes note of this problem when stating that “the construction of the idea of the missing
shade of blue obviously requires conceptual powers unaccounted for by impressions and their
images.” 37 Looking back at our analysis of the Missing Shade of Blue, the necessity of a certain
level of abstract reasoning is evident in order for the missing shade of blue take shape. While
Hume does not acknowledge the Missing Shade of Blue as being able to shake his foundation,
the thought experiment shows that Hume’s exception might have cause to be a valid innate idea.
Setting aside our previous argument for the triangulation of the missing shade, the possibility of
the final shade of blue being an innate idea does present itself since it comes about without any
corresponding impression. This in its own right should raise a red flag for Hume and warrant at
least an explanation by him, a philosopher in the empiricist school.
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At this juncture, defining exactly what we mean by an innate idea is appropriate. There
are three ways in which these words may apply in the context of the missing shade of blue:
1. An idea that is inborn and a part of a person from birth. 38
2. An idea that does not come about from experience.
3. An idea that comes about from a generalization of an experience.
With regards to Hume’s missing shade, only the latter two definitions apply. As a strict
empiricist, Hume is completely opposed to the notion that inborn innate ideas existed. When the
Treatise and Enquiry focus on the copy principle as well as Hume’s general claim about the
divisions of knowledge, they both show how experience was the precursor to ideas and
knowledge. Hence, when looking at the missing shade of blue as an innate idea, it has to be an
idea that either does not come about from experience or comes about from a generalization of an
experience.
The second definition of innate ideas is the one that can hurt Hume’s case, specifically,
his principles relating to the causal connection between ideas and impressions. If indeed there is
an idea that does not come about through an experience, then the validity of empiricism as a
whole begins to falter. However, the missing shade of blue case appears to fall most in line with
the third definition of innate ideas. A generalization of prior experiences, in this case the
secondary impressions of the other shades of blue, leads to the simple idea of the final shade of
blue. Barry Stroud makes the distinction by calling them observed and unobserved ideas.
Observed ideas come directly from experience, while unobserved ideas come from
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generalizations of prior experiences. 39 Hume himself states that the process of generalizations
take ideas from the observed distinction to the unobserved when discussing the formulation of
our habits or customs. When viewing the case of the Missing Shade of Blue, it is the faculty of
reason that generalizes prior experiences of the various shades of blue into the various gradations
that eventually lead to the simple idea of the missing shade of blue. Thus, though the missing
shade is an innate idea by our third definition, it is not strictly innate. Meaning, in the rational
sense the simple idea of the missing shade of blue is still dependent on the generalization of past
experiences.
Regarding innate ideas, Nancy Kendrick brings forth a reasonable problem that she
argues many have with Hume. Specifically, her issue is with Hume’s dismissive attitude of the
missing shade of blue. According to Kendrick, the possibility of the simple idea being an innate
idea itself can be damaging enough to Hume’s first principles. She claims that many argue Hume
intentionally dismisses it because the inclusion of it would leave an even greater threat to his
philosophy, specifically the notion of a synthetic a priori 40 idea. This, in essence, means that
people can have new ideas on the basis of things outside of their experiences. In other words, it
would have supported an anti-empirical claim. This claim can then be taken and supportive of
greater claims such as the existence of God in favor of the rationalists. 41 Rationalists then have
become right with regards to their notions of innate ideas as well as the origin of ideas. For
Hume, that would mean the negation of his philosophical principles that he so strongly
establishes in both his Treatise and Enquiry. However, we already argued that innate ideas, in
39
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this instance, refer to generalizations based on previous experiences, or the formulations of
habits and customs.
This being so, the problem initially raised by Kendrick about whether or not the missing
shade is a synthetic a priori idea is defused. Since Hume’s exception, as previously mentioned, is
grounded strictly in a priori, it cannot be referred to as being synthetic. Even though the ideas
used to attain the missing shade of blue are they themselves synthetic, since they were
experienced, the idea of the missing shade itself is not. The idea of the missing shade of blue is
somewhat of a fiction in this sense. It is a fiction because it forms within the mind but has no
valid way of presenting itself outside of the mind. The latter was evident when we looked at the
futility of trying to empirically prove a violation within the causal condition of the copy
principle. Hume, therefore, does not need to consider the missing shade of blue as an innate idea
a serious threat beyond the dismissal and labeling of it as an exception to his general maxim.
Lastly, the ability to find the missing shade of blue may prove difficult for Hume given
various writings on optics. Eric Schliesser, for example, has argued that Hume’s missing shade
of blue stands “in contradiction to the implications of Newton’s optical researches.” 42 More
directly, Schliesser’s main point shows how Hume does not take Newton’s insights regarding the
difficulty of finding the missing shade of blue into account and “turn an objection into a
constructive element in an ongoing research enterprise.” 43 Newton’s optical experiments indicate
that when the shades of colors gets close enough it becomes impossible for the subject to be able
to distinguish between shades. Hence, if Newton’s research is correct, then Hume’s entire
example would at the very least raise questions and not be seen as an exception. Additionally,
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Schliesser points to the following passage from the Treatise to show how Hume is once again
contradicting himself: “it be impossible to judge exactly of the degrees or any quality, such as
colour, taste, heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very small.” 44 When considering
the demands of Hume’s thought experiment, it seems contradictory that he requires the subject to
make the determination in degrees of shades of blue while several pages later in the Treatise he
himself claims that it is impossible to make such determinations in degree.
Taking this further, Schliesser focuses on Hume’s approach as resting on two apparent
“commonsensical, but unempirical tacit assumptions: that we view (shades of) colors as discrete
entities and that our experiences and knowledge of the world does not influence what we see.” 45
Essentially Schliesser is arguing that if Hume is leaning on the first assumption that different
shades of blue are individually distinct ideas, then bringing these ideas together for a similar
purpose, in this instance to find the missing shade, becomes difficult. Finally, taking into account
the notion of Newton’s Rule IV, 46 Schliesser shows that deviations from maxims should not
warrant a simple dismissal, like Hume tends to do with the exception of the missing shade of
blue. Instead, they should promote new research and findings.
Newtonian arguments against Hume by Schliesser, however, are insufficient as well.
Firstly, Hume acknowledged the main issue of the impossibility of being able to distinguish
between two shades of color in the Treatise. However, even in granting this to be the case, we
may tailor the thought experiment itself so that it meets the new criterion. The experiment can
now just be a bit more specific and state that the previously experienced shades of color placed
44
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before the individual be in a degree that is distinguishable. This will not change the outcome of
the individual being able to fill in the missing shade of blue. As a result, Hume is both agreeing
with Newtonian optics but still maintaining his exception on the grounds of a more broad
distinction of shades presented in the thought experiment. Additionally, Hume’s dismissal of the
exception does not preclude his philosophy from finding Newton’s Rule IV as a useful tool. It is
in fact quite the contrary as we previously discussed when analyzing Hume’s self-critique.
Essentially, Hume is definitely open to the idea of further examination but felt that the missing
shade of blue did not make any real impact on his initial claims regarding ideas and impressions.
Finally, the difficulty of being able to bring two distinct ideas together is really not as
difficult as Schliesser claims it is. Difficulty, in this sense, is referring to how well Hume’s
claims can allow for such collaboration between ideas. It is relatively clear in both the Enquiry
and Treatise that Hume does believe in the ability for distinct ideas to be used by the faculty of
reason, or ‘imagination’, in order to serve a third related purpose. The initial impressions that
turn into simple ideas, according to Hume, are necessities in order for one to form ‘customs’,
‘habits’, and fictional ideas not found in reality. For example, the initial impressions that one has
of a horse and various birds can cause their imagination to come up with the idea of Pegasus
even though no such creature exists. This is also the case for the missing shade of blue with the
surrounding shades serving as secondary impressions and the mind going through a process of
abstract reasoning in order to arrive at the missing shade. In both cases, the abstract ideas formed
through the faculty of reason are what create the relation between not only the various distinct
secondary impressions but also to the idea of final shade of blue.
VII. Conclusion
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Although Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue appears to contradict his initial claims about the
relation between impressions and ideas in his copy principle, my analysis shows that this is not
the case. Hume’s copy principle holds in this unusual case by way of triangulation among
impressions, secondary impressions, and the simple idea of the missing shade. From this, I then
moved onto discussing how Hume’s principle allows for the Missing Shade of Blue to be a valid
exception while simultaneously not a threat to his core commitments. I accomplished this by
analyzing the components of my initial break down of the thought experiment. Then, upon
looking at Hume’s copy principle in greater detail, I established that the causal condition
between ideas and impressions remained intact. From this point I transitioned into Hume
himself, specifically, his character and self-critique of his works. My focus here was to argue that
given Hume’s character and nature, it is evident that the inclusion of the Missing Shade of Blue,
as Hume intended, strengthens his Treatise and Enquiry.
Finally, I made the transition into critiquing various arguments that might be made
against Hume. The arguments discussed dealt both broadly and specifically with Hume’s
Missing Shade of Blue. In a broad sense, I looked at arguments targeting the function of the
thought experiment, the principles it relates to, such as the copy principle, as well as its surface
contradictions. More minutely, I looked at arguments within the actual thought experiment.
These include: Hume’s quick dismissal of the thought experiment, the missing shade’s ability to
be a valid innate idea, and the issue surrounding the thought experiment’s singularity. All of the
arguments against Hume, however, were easily refuted as they stemmed mostly from
misunderstandings of the Missing Shade of Blue within the context of Hume’s empirical
philosophy. My analysis therefore, shows that Hume’s thought experiment in fact strengthened
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his claims by allowing for greater versatility. As a result, we see a more open-minded and critical
Hume.

P a g e | 34

References
Becker, Lon. "The Missing Shade of Blue as a Proof Against Proof." British Journal for the
History of Philosophy 18.1 (2010): 35-44. EBSCO Host. Routledge. Web.
<http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=4d97b8f0-d95c-44f6-897e95037e93778d%40sessionmgr4003&vid=2&hid=4203>.
Butler, Ronald J. "Hume's Impressions." Impressions of Empiricism. Ed. Godfrey Norman
Vesey. New York: St. Martin's, 1976. 120-35. Print.
Downing, Lisa, "George Berkeley", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/berkeley/>.
Durland, Karánn. "Hume's First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of Reason."
Hume Studies 22.1 (1996): 105-21. Hume Studies Onine. Hume Society. Web.
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v22n1/durland/durland-v22n1.pdf>.
Fogelin, Robert J. "Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 45.2 (1984): 263. JSTOR. International Phenomenological Society. Web.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107428>.
Hume, David. "Author's Advertisement." Introduction. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. N. pag. Project Gutenberg. 12 Jan. 2010. Web.
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm>.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748. Classics of Western
Philosophy. 7th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006. 763-828. Print.

P a g e | 35

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Project
Gutenberg. 15 Nov. 2011. Web. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662h.htm>.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 1740. Classics of Western Philosophy. 7th ed.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006. 829-55. Print.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Project Gutenberg. 10 Nov. 2012.
Web. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm>.
Hume, David. "My Own Life." Letter. 18 Apr. 1776. The University of Adelaide.
Ebooks@Adelaide, 26 Feb. 2014. Web.
<http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92my/#life>.
Johnson, D.M. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue, Interpreted as Involving Habitual Spectra."
Hume Studies 10.2 (1984): 109-24. Hume Studies Online. Hume Society. Web.
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v10n2/johnson/johnson-v10n2.pdf>.
Kendrick, Nancy. "Why Hume's Counterexample Is Insignificant and Why It Is Not." British
Journal for the History of Philosophy 17.5 (2009): 955-79. EBSCO Host. Routledge.
Web. <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fff42b4a-67f3-490ea924-62d9c0df0d63%40sessionmgr4002&vid=2&hid=4203>.
Landy, David. "Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction." Hume Studies 32.1 (2006): 119-39. Hume
Studies Online. Hume Society. Web.
<http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v32n1/landy/landy-v32n1.pdf>.
Livingston, Donald W., and James T. King. Hume: A Re-evaluation. New York: Fordham UP,
1976. 91-180. Print.

P a g e | 36

Livingston, Donald W. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1984. 8090. Print.
Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/>.
Rollin, Bernard E. "Hume's Blue Patch and the Mind's Creativity." Journal of the History of
Ideas 32.1 (1971): 119-28. Print.
Savage, Reginald O. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue." History of Philosophy Quarterly 9.2
(1992): 199-206. Web.
Schliesser, Eric. "Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Reconsidered From a Newtonian Perspective."
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2.2 (2004): 164-75. Print.
Sheridan, Patricia, "Locke's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-moral/>.
Stroud, Barry. "Hume and the Idea of Causal Necessity." Philosophical Studies 33.1 (1978): 3959. JSTOR. Springer. Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319195>.
Stroud, Barry. "The Theory of Ideas." Hume. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1981. 17-42.
Routledge. Web. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/baruch//docDetail.action?docID=10060780>.
Williams, William H. "Is Hume's Shade of Blue a Red Herring?" Synthese 92.1 (1992): 83-99.
Print.

